Iran's IRGC proposal in the Strait of Hormuz exposes the fragility of submarine cables that carry 95–99% of global data traffic.
Why in News
A proposal by Iranian state media, linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), to impose licensing fees and 'protection' payments on undersea-cable operators in the Strait of Hormuz has revived global concern over the vulnerability of submarine cables. These fibre-optic lines carry 95–99% of all international data — the backbone of digital connectivity, finance and government communications. The UN General Assembly in 2010 described submarine cables as 'critical communication infrastructure'. Recent Red Sea cable cuts in 2024 disrupted internet across Asia and West Asia, and tech giants like Meta, Amazon and Microsoft are racing to build redundant routes — Meta itself announced a 50,000-km cable spanning five continents. The Iran proposal places India's IT-BPM, banking and strategic communications in the line of disruption.
At a Glance
- Submarine cables = fibre-optic lines on the ocean floor carrying global data.
- They handle 95–99% of all international data traffic — the internet's backbone.
- UNGA (2010) recognised them as critical communication infrastructure.
- Cables are cheaper, faster and higher-bandwidth than satellite alternatives.
- Narrow corridors (Red Sea, Strait of Hormuz, Suez, Malacca) are digital chokepoints.
- Iran's IRGC proposed licensing fees on operators in the Strait of Hormuz.
- Major operators
- Meta, Amazon, Microsoft, Google, Reliance Jio, Bharti Airtel.
- Meta plans a 50,000-km cable linking five continents for redundancy.
- Threats
- state-sponsored sabotage, grey-zone warfare, cyber-tap, anchor drag, sabotage drones.
- 2024 Red Sea cable cuts disrupted internet across Asia and West Asia.
- Indian finance and stock-trading systems rely on near-instant cable links.
- India's IT-BPM exports depend on uninterrupted global connectivity.
- Cables are commonly owned by consortia of telcos and tech majors.
- Repair vessels are scarce — typical repair takes weeks, even in safe seas.
What are undersea cables?
Submarine (undersea) cables are fibre-optic cables laid on the ocean floor that carry data between continents. They are the literal backbone of the modern internet: estimates suggest they carry between 95% and 99% of all international data traffic, dwarfing the share carried by satellites. Each cable is about the diameter of a garden hose, with the fibre core protected by steel armouring, insulation and a sheath. Repeaters every ~50–80 km amplify the optical signal. Cables are generally laid and owned by consortia of telecom operators, increasingly joined by hyperscalers like Google, Meta, Microsoft and Amazon, who lease or directly own dedicated capacity to connect their data centres.
Why they matter strategically
Subsea cables are far more efficient, cost-effective and reliable than satellites for bulk data: a single modern cable can carry hundreds of terabits per second. Almost every inter-bank transfer, stock trade, video call, military command, intelligence sharing and cloud-service interaction between countries crosses these cables. The UN General Assembly in 2010 explicitly described submarine cables as 'critical communication infrastructure' under international law. Damage to a cable does not merely slow down social media — it can paralyse payment systems, stock exchanges, business-process operations and military communications within minutes. This is why their physical and cyber security has become a top-tier national security concern.
Digital chokepoints — where cables converge
Although the seafloor is vast, undersea cables tend to follow a few narrow maritime corridors for geographic and political reasons. These corridors — the Red Sea, Strait of Hormuz, Suez Canal, Strait of Malacca, Bab-el-Mandeb, and the Luzon Strait — are now described as 'digital chokepoints'. The Red Sea alone carries cables linking Europe, the Gulf and Asia; 2024 cable cuts there disrupted internet services across multiple countries. The Strait of Hormuz is similarly cable-dense and now in the spotlight after Iran's proposal. Cable redundancy — laying alternative routes around Africa, across the Arctic, or via Central Asia — is a strategic countermeasure that several governments and tech firms are now pursuing.
Iran's IRGC proposal — what's new
Iranian state-media reports indicate that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) — Iran's most powerful armed force, established after the 1979 Islamic Revolution — has proposed levying licensing fees and annual 'protection' payments from foreign telecom and tech firms (including Meta, Amazon and Microsoft) whose cables transit the Strait of Hormuz. The IRGC, which operates independently of Iran's regular military and reports to the Supreme Leader, also controls the Basij Resistance Force and Iran's maritime militias. The proposal is significant because it represents a state actor attempting to monetise — and potentially weaponise — control over a digital chokepoint, blurring the line between sovereign jurisdiction, commercial extortion and grey-zone coercion.
Threat landscape
Key threats to undersea cables include: State-sponsored intervention (e.g., the IRGC's protection-fee proposal); grey-zone warfare, where ambiguous actors (e.g., shadow fleets, dual-use trawlers) sever cables through anchor drags or sabotage drones; espionage and cyber threats, including state-sponsored wiretapping and attacks on network-management systems; physical accidents from fishing trawlers and seismic events; and chokepoint convergence, where many cables share a narrow corridor. The 2024 Red Sea incidents — widely linked to Houthi-related disruption and anchor drags from a damaged vessel — knocked out cables like AAE-1, SEACOM and EIG, slowing internet across Asia and West Asia.
Implications for India
India is among the world's most cable-dependent economies. Its IT-BPM industry (Information Technology – Business Process Management) — which exported over US$200 billion in services in FY24 — relies on uninterrupted global connectivity. Indian stock-trading and banking systems depend on millisecond-grade cable links to London, Singapore and New York. The Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea both lie astride the India–West Asia and India–Europe corridors, including the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). Disruptions therefore translate directly into financial risk, IT-services SLAs and strategic communications. India is responding with new domestic cable landings (Mumbai, Chennai, Trivandrum, Tuticorin), participation in the Meta 50,000-km cable, and policy thinking around a cable-protection framework.
Must Remember
- •Submarine cables carry 95–99% of international data traffic, the backbone of the global internet and finance.
- •Iran's IRGC has proposed licensing fees on undersea-cable operators in the Strait of Hormuz.
- •The UN General Assembly in 2010 described submarine cables as critical communication infrastructure.
- •The Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea are key digital chokepoints where multiple cables converge.
- •Submarine cables offer larger bandwidth and lower latency than satellite alternatives.
- •Meta plans a 50,000-km undersea cable spanning five continents to strengthen its network.
- •Cable cuts in the Red Sea in 2024 disrupted internet services across Asia and West Asia.
- •India's IT-BPM industry and stock-trading systems depend critically on undersea-cable connectivity.
| Rank | Company | Notable role |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Meta | Lead investor in 50,000-km cable; partner in 2Africa |
| 2 | Owns or anchors multiple trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic cables | |
| 3 | Microsoft | Co-owner of Marea, AEC and other transatlantic systems |
| 4 | Amazon (AWS) | Anchors cables linking AWS Regions globally |
Static GK
- •: The Strait of Hormuz lies between Iran and Oman and connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman.
- •: The Red Sea connects to the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal and to the Indian Ocean via Bab-el-Mandeb.
- •: The Strait of Malacca lies between the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra, linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
- •: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was formally established in 1979 after the Islamic Revolution.
- •: The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982, governs the laying and protection of submarine cables on the high seas.
- •: Meta, Google, Microsoft and Amazon are the four largest hyperscalers investing in subsea cables today.
- •: Reliance Jio and Bharti Airtel operate or have stakes in major cable systems landing on Indian shores.
- •: Major Indian cable landing stations are located at Mumbai, Chennai, Cochin, Tuticorin and Trivandrum.
- •: TeleGeography is a leading research firm that maps and tracks global submarine cable networks.
- •: India's IT-BPM exports exceeded US$200 billion in FY2023-24, per NASSCOM estimates.
- •: Cyclone disruptions and seabed earthquakes are natural hazards to undersea cables, alongside trawler damage.
- •: Iran's currency is the Iranian Rial; capital Tehran; current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
- •: The IRGC commands its own land, air and sea forces, separate from Iran's regular Artesh military.
- •: Houthi attacks have repeatedly threatened shipping and cables in the Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb since 2023.
- •: AAE-1, SEACOM, EIG and 2Africa are among the major cable systems serving the Asia–Europe corridor.
- •: India's National Long-Distance (NLD) policy and Telecom Act, 2023 provide the domestic legal frame for cable landings.
Glossary
- Submarine cable
- Fibre-optic cable laid on the ocean floor to carry global data, voice and internet traffic between continents.
- Digital chokepoint
- Narrow maritime corridor where many undersea cables converge, creating concentrated vulnerability to disruption.
- IRGC
- Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps — Iran's most powerful armed force, set up after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, reporting to the Supreme Leader.
- Basij Resistance Force
- A volunteer paramilitary organisation under the IRGC, used for internal security and morale operations in Iran.
- Grey-zone warfare
- Use of coercive tools below the threshold of armed conflict — sabotage, deniable operations, cyber, economic pressure.
- UNGA Resolution 2010
- UN General Assembly recognition that submarine cables are 'critical communication infrastructure' deserving international protection.
- IT-BPM industry
- Information Technology and Business Process Management sector — Indian companies providing IT services and outsourcing globally.
- Bandwidth
- The maximum rate of data transfer across a communication channel, measured in bits per second.
- Repeater
- Underwater device placed every 50–80 km along a cable to amplify optical signals and offset losses over long distances.
- Strait of Hormuz
- Narrow waterway between Iran and Oman through which a significant share of global oil and many undersea cables transit.
- Cable consortium
- Group of telecom operators and tech firms that jointly fund, build and operate a long-haul submarine cable.
- Anchor drag
- Damage to undersea cables caused by ship anchors dragging across the seabed, a common cause of cable cuts in shallow waters.
- Sovereign immunity (cables)
- Legal principle limiting the extent to which a coastal State can regulate cables beyond its territorial waters, under UNCLOS.
- IMEC
- India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor — multi-modal connectivity project linking India, the Gulf, Israel and Europe.
Timeline
- 1858First transatlantic telegraph cable laid — Ireland to Newfoundland — birth of the submarine cable industry.
- 1979Islamic Revolution in Iran; IRGC is established to protect the new revolutionary system.
- 1982UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides the framework for laying and protecting submarine cables.
- 1988First trans-oceanic fibre-optic submarine cable (TAT-8) goes live between the US and Europe.
- 2010UN General Assembly recognises submarine cables as 'critical communication infrastructure'.
- 2018First large-scale hyperscaler-owned cable (Marea by Microsoft and Meta) goes operational.
- 2023Red Sea security deteriorates with Houthi attacks on shipping, raising cable-cut concerns.
- February 2024Multiple Red Sea cables (AAE-1, SEACOM, EIG, TGN-Eurasia) suffer cuts, disrupting Asia–Europe traffic.
- 2024Meta announces a 50,000-km undersea cable spanning five continents.
- March 2025Hyperscalers accelerate cable redundancy investments around Africa and Central Asia.
- 2026IRGC proposal to charge undersea-cable operators in the Strait of Hormuz makes global headlines.
- →Submarine cables carry 95–99% of international data traffic.
- →UNGA 2010 — submarine cables are 'critical communication infrastructure'.
- →Iran's IRGC — created 1979, after Islamic Revolution.
- →IRGC controls the Basij Resistance Force inside Iran.
- →Strait of Hormuz — between Iran and Oman, links Persian Gulf to Gulf of Oman.
- →Red Sea + Strait of Hormuz = key 'digital chokepoints'.
- →Meta plans a 50,000-km undersea cable across 5 continents.
- →Big cable investors: Meta, Amazon, Microsoft, Google.
- →2024 Red Sea cable cuts — AAE-1, SEACOM, EIG hit.
- →India's IT-BPM exports — over US$200 billion annually.
- →Indian cable landings: Mumbai, Chennai, Trivandrum, Cochin, Tuticorin.
- →UNCLOS, 1982 — governs cables on the high seas.
- →Submarine cables = fibre-optic lines on the seabed.
- →Repeaters every 50–80 km along the cable amplify signals.
- →Cables = larger bandwidth, lower latency than satellites.
- →Iranian Rial — currency; Tehran — capital; Supreme Leader: Ali Khamenei.
Exam Angles
Iran's IRGC-backed proposal to charge undersea-cable operators in the Strait of Hormuz spotlights global vulnerability of submarine fibre carrying 95–99% of international data.
Q1. Submarine (undersea) cables currently carry approximately what share of international data traffic?
- A.Between 95% and 99% of international data traffic
- B.Less than 40% of international data traffic
- C.About 25%, with satellites carrying most of the rest
- D.About 70%, with the remainder over high-altitude balloons
tap to reveal answer
Answer: A. Between 95% and 99% of international data traffic
Submarine cables carry 95–99% of international data traffic, making them the backbone of the global internet. Satellites carry only a small share, mainly for last-mile or specialised connectivity. The other options understate cable dominance.
Q2. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was established to protect the country's Islamic system following which event?
- A.The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran
- B.The Iran–Iraq War of 1980–88
- C.The 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mosaddegh
- D.The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015
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Answer: A. The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran
The IRGC was created in 1979 after the Islamic Revolution to protect the new revolutionary system. It commands separate land, air and sea forces and oversees the Basij Resistance Force, reporting directly to the Supreme Leader, independent of the regular Iranian military.
Q3. The term 'digital chokepoints' in the context of global internet infrastructure refers to:
- A.Narrow maritime corridors such as the Red Sea or Strait of Hormuz where many undersea cables converge, becoming strategically vulnerable
- B.Data centres located in earthquake-prone seismic regions such as Japan and California with high vulnerability to natural disasters
- C.Border firewalls that filter inbound and outbound internet traffic of a country and act as gatekeepers for the national network
- D.Critical satellite ground stations operated by hyperscalers in equatorial belts which co-ordinate global low-earth-orbit constellations
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Answer: A. Narrow maritime corridors such as the Red Sea or Strait of Hormuz where many undersea cables converge, becoming strategically vulnerable
Digital chokepoints are narrow maritime corridors where multiple cables converge — the Red Sea, Strait of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb, Malacca — making them disproportionately vulnerable to disruption. The other options describe data-centre risk, censorship infrastructure or satellite ground systems, not chokepoints.
Q4. Consider the following pairs about strategic waterways and the countries that border them:
1. Strait of Hormuz — Iran and Oman
2. Bab-el-Mandeb — Yemen and Djibouti
3. Strait of Malacca — Malaysia and Indonesia
4. Suez Canal — Egypt
Which of the above pairs is/are correctly matched?
- A.1, 2, 3 and 4
- B.1 and 4 only
- C.2 and 3 only
- D.1, 2 and 3 only
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Answer: A. 1, 2, 3 and 4
All four pairs are correct. The Strait of Hormuz lies between Iran and Oman, Bab-el-Mandeb between Yemen and Djibouti/Eritrea, the Strait of Malacca between Malaysia and Indonesia, and the Suez Canal lies in Egypt. Hence all four pairs are correctly matched.
Q5. Consider the following statements:
1. The UN General Assembly in 2010 recognised submarine cables as 'critical communication infrastructure'.
2. The IRGC reports to the regular Iranian military through the Ministry of Defence.
3. Submarine cables have larger bandwidth and are more cost-effective than satellite alternatives.
4. Meta has announced a 50,000-km undersea cable spanning five continents.
Which of the above statements is/are correct?
- A.1, 3 and 4 only
- B.1, 2 and 3 only
- C.1 and 4 only
- D.1, 2, 3 and 4
tap to reveal answer
Answer: A. 1, 3 and 4 only
Statement 1 is correct — UNGA 2010 recognised submarine cables as critical communication infrastructure. Statement 2 is incorrect — the IRGC reports directly to the Supreme Leader, independent of the regular military. Statement 3 is correct on bandwidth and cost-effectiveness. Statement 4 is correct — Meta's 50,000-km cable project. Hence statements 1, 3 and 4 are correct.
Q6. Consider the following statements:
1. Indian stock-trading and banking systems rely on near-instant submarine-cable connectivity.
2. India's IT-BPM industry depends on uninterrupted global connectivity for service delivery.
3. Mumbai, Chennai, Cochin and Trivandrum host major Indian cable landing stations.
4. India is not party to any cable-relevant international convention.
How many of the above statements are correct?
- A.Only three
- B.All four
- C.Only two
- D.Only one
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Answer: A. Only three
Statements 1, 2 and 3 are correct — Indian finance, IT-BPM and cable-landing geography are all exposed. Statement 4 is incorrect — India is a party to UNCLOS, which governs the laying and protection of submarine cables. Hence three statements are correct.
Q7. Which of the following best describes 'grey-zone warfare' in the context of undersea cables?
- A.Use of ambiguous, deniable tactics — sabotage, anchor drags, cyber-intrusion — below the threshold of open armed conflict
- B.Open declaration of war on a private technology firm by a sovereign State, accompanied by economic blockade and political sanctions
- C.Use of nuclear-deterrence posture by a State to protect its undersea cable infrastructure from external sabotage or hostile interference
- D.Multilateral economic sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council against a State for damaging undersea critical communication infrastructure
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Answer: A. Use of ambiguous, deniable tactics — sabotage, anchor drags, cyber-intrusion — below the threshold of open armed conflict
Grey-zone warfare uses ambiguous, deniable, sub-threshold tactics — sabotage, cyber-intrusion, anchor drags by 'shadow' vessels — to coerce or disrupt without triggering open war. The other options describe open warfare, deterrence theory or UN-mandated sanctions, not grey-zone conduct.
Q1. From a strategic-defence perspective, which of the following best captures India's primary vulnerability arising from disruption to undersea cables in the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea?
- A.Disruption of secure long-distance military and intelligence communications, plus financial and IT-BPM service flows
- B.Loss of nuclear command and control which is wholly dependent on undersea cables
- C.Inability to operate satellite-based PNT (positioning) services within Indian territory
- D.Direct kinetic threat to Indian naval assets stationed in the Persian Gulf
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Answer: A. Disruption of secure long-distance military and intelligence communications, plus financial and IT-BPM service flows
The primary vulnerability is disruption to long-distance secure communications, intelligence sharing and India's IT-BPM and financial flows, all of which transit cable corridors via Hormuz and the Red Sea. India's nuclear C2 has alternative redundant means; PNT is satellite-based; and direct kinetic threat to naval assets is a separate risk category, not cable-driven.
Globalisation has made undersea cables — invisible, expensive, fragile fibre lines — the literal backbone of the world's economy and statecraft. India, with one of the world's largest IT-BPM industries and an increasingly internationalised financial market, is uniquely cable-dependent. Iran's IRGC-linked proposal to charge cable operators in the Strait of Hormuz, layered on top of Red Sea cable cuts and grey-zone risk, signals a new era in which states may attempt to monetise or weaponise digital chokepoints. India's response must integrate diplomacy, naval presence, cable-protection law and domestic redundancy.
- Weaponising digital chokepointsIran's proposal — if pursued — would set a **precedent for states to monetise control over digital chokepoints**, raising costs for hyperscalers and Indian telcos and inviting reciprocal action elsewhere (e.g., Bab-el-Mandeb, Malacca).
- Resilience through redundancyIndia must accelerate **cable redundancy** — landing more cables on its east and west coasts, supporting **alternative routes around Africa**, and participating in projects like the **Meta 50,000-km cable** to reduce single-corridor dependence.
- A domestic cable-protection regimeIndia lacks a dedicated **Submarine Cable Protection Act**. A clear framework defining cable corridors, sanctions for damage, and inter-agency coordination (DoT, MoD, MEA, MHA) is overdue, building on the Telecommunications Act, 2023.
- Grey-zone deniabilityMany recent cable incidents are **deniable** — anchor drags, shadow fleets, sabotage. India's intelligence and maritime-domain-awareness capabilities must be strengthened, ideally through **IFC-IOR in Gurugram** and partner navies.
- Multilateral norm-buildingIndia should push for a **multilateral compact** on cable security under **UNCLOS** and at fora like the **Quad** and **G20**, treating cables on par with shipping lanes and air routes as global commons.
Mains Q · 250w'Submarine cables are the invisible arteries of the global digital economy.' Examine the threats to undersea cables, with reference to the Strait of Hormuz, and suggest measures India should adopt to safeguard its digital sovereignty. (15 marks, 250 words)
Flashcard
Q · Iran's IRGC-backed proposal to charge undersea-cable operators in the Strait of Hormuz spotlights global vulnerability of submarine fibre carrying 95–99% of international data.tap to reveal
Connections & Comparisons
- ↔Pairs with: bharat-maritime-insurance-pool-2026 — both respond to Red Sea / Hormuz disruptions of India's trade and data routes.
- ↔Compare with: SWIFT, Suez Canal — other 'invisible infrastructure' chokepoints in finance and trade.
- ↔Track jointly: % of India's data traffic transiting Hormuz/Red Sea vs. share routed around Africa.
- ↔Strategic frame: IMEC + Quad cable initiatives — Indo-Pacific resilience of digital backbones.
- ↔Historical parallel: 1858 Atlantic telegraph cable — first time strategic powers realised cable control = power.